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Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School District,
450 Pa. 207, 299 A.2d 277 (1973).
It is not unusual for employers to adopt rules regulating the
continued employment of pregnant employees. Recently, however,
the courts in a number of jurisdictions have considered whether
those regulations that require resignation or a mandatory leave of
absence for pregnant employees are legally acceptable.' In the
recent case of Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School District,2
1. Green v. Board of Educ., No. 72-1676 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 1973);
Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1972), vacated and
remanded for consideration of mootness, 93 S. Ct. 676 (1972); Schattman
v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 330 F. Supp. 328 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd,
459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972); Gutierrez v. Laird, 346 F. Supp. 289 (D.C.
1972); Heath v. Board of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Ohio 1972);
Pocklington v. School Bd., 345 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Bravo v.
Board of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Williams v. School Dist.,
340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Calif. 1972); Robinson v. Rand, 340 F. Supp. 37 (D.
Colo. 1972); Guelich v. Public School Dist. No. 621, 334 F. Supp. 1276 (D.
Minn. 1972); Doe v. Osteopathic Hosp., 333 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Kan. 1971);
Cohen v. School Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd No. 71-1707
(4th Cir. Jan. 15, 1973); LaFleur v. Board of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208
(N.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd, 365 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972); Cheatwood v. South
Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp. 754 (H.D. Ala. 1969); Monell v.
Department of Social Servs., 4 CCH Empl. Prac. 7765 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Cerra v. School Dist., 3 Pa. Commonwealth 665, 285 A-2d 206 (1971), rev'd,
299 A.2d 277 (1973). For a summary of recent cases with reference to
federal, state and municipal administrative developments, see NAIONAL
EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, N.Y. LEGAL DEVELoPmENTS IN SEx DISCRIMINA-
TION CONCERNING MATERITY LEAVES AND BENrrrs (Dec. 1972).
2. 450 Pa. 207, 299 A.2d 277 (1973).
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, reversing the Pennsylvania
commonwealth court,3 held that a regulation requiring resigna-
tion of employees by the fifth month of pregnancy could not
stand.
4
In Cerra, the plaintiff was dismissed from her job as a tenured
teacher with the East Stroudsburg Area School District pursuant
to a rule requiring the resignation of any employee at the end of
the fifth month of pregnancy.5 At an evidentiary hearing before
the board, the termination of her contract was sustained because
of her disobedience of a proper regulation and because she was
physically incapable of performing her duties. Her dismissal took
place twelve days before the end of the term and her offer to re-
turn to her employment at the beginning of the new term in Sep-
tember, after the birth of her child, was rejected.
The policy of regulating the employment of pregnant women
has been condoned in the past as an acceptable employment prac-
tice designed to protect women and, incidentally, the human race. 6
The practice of a forced resignation, or a mandatory leave of ab-
sence so long as to be tantamount to resignation,7 was rarely chal-
lenged.8 That the restrictions were viewed as a social necessity is
evident in the following excerpt from a Supreme Court decision:
That woman's physical structure and the performance
of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the
struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is especially true
when the burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even
when they are not, by abundant testimony of the medical
fraternity continuance for a long time on her feet at work,
repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious effects
upon the body, and as healthy mothers are essential to
vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of women be-
comes an object of public interest and care in order to
preserve the strength and vigor of the race.9
Whether such logic deserved perpetuation is at best questionable.
Other courts nevertheless upheld protective legislation for women
3. 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 665, 285 A.2d 206 (1971).
4. 450 Pa. 207, 211, 299 A.2d 277, 279 (1973).
5. Id. at 209, 299 A.2d at 278.
6. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); 36 ALABANY L.
REV. 586 (1972); 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 496 (1971).
7. The board of school directors in School Dist. v. Snyder, 346 Pa.
103, 29 A.2d 34 (1942), demanded a two year maternity leave. In Schattman
v. Texas Employment Comm., 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972), the employer did
not automatically reinstate the women who were forced to take leave and
as a result the plaintiff lost her job, which she planned to make her career,
as a labor market analyst. As in Schattman, many maternity leave policies
challenged in the cases listed note 1, supra, do not include a promise to
keep the employee's job available for automatic reinstatement.
8. Prior to the rash of cases listed note 1, supra, few decisions can
be found which deal directly with this issue. Pennsylvania is unusual in
having decided two earlier cases challenging maternity leaves: School
Dist. v. Snyder, 346 Pa. 103, 29 A.2d 34 (1942); Brown's Case, 151 Pa. Super.
522, 30 A.2d 726, aff'd 347 Pa. 418, 32 A.2d 565 (1943).




Protecting the interests of the employee was not the only con-
sideration motivating the courts to uphold employer's limitations
on pregnant women. Regulations were often adopted and upheld
on the basis of stereotyped notions of women, particularly women
who become pregnant, as a class.'1 Some courts have given great
weight to testimony of experts who contend that these employees
are less competent, less reliable, more prone to absenteeism, rep-
resent a hazard and give rise to embarrassment and worse. 2 The
board rule enforcing termination of employment, final or tempo-
rary, is seen by these courts as a reasonable solution since it
negates the possibility of such difficulties ever arising.
1 3
The first Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision concerning en-
forced maternity leave for a teacher was Ambridge Borough School
10. LaFleur v. Board of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208, 1212 (N.D. Ohio
1971) cited Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, and relied on evidence that "the
purpose of this rule was to protect the teacher . . ." Id. at 1210. LaFleur
upheld a rule which did not permit the return of the teacher to work until
the semester following the child's reaching the age of three months since
it was "designed to protect the health of the mother and the child." Id.
at 1211. The court also found that "[t]he problem of the teacher's health
and safety, before and after the child's birth, is of itself a valid concern of
the school board ..... " Id. at 1213.
11. In Brown's Case, 151 Pa. Super. 522, 30 A.2d 726 (1943) the court
upheld the dismissal of a teacher for pregnancy on the basis that, unlike
sickness that would entitle her to sick leave, it rendered her physically
incompetent. The commonwealth court in Cerra v. School Dist., 3 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 665, 285 A.2d 206 (1971), allowed the rule requiring
resignation to stand after hearing evidence from the school superintendent
and principal to the effect that maternity leaves were unsatisfactory. The
school officials reported an instance where four teachers on leave failed
to return, causing inconvenience to the school. In Schattman v. Texas Em-
ployment Comm'n., 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972), the court passed over the
testimony of the employee's own physician, stating that pregnant people
can do as much work as those who are not pregnant and that the plaintiff
was capable of working up to her delivery if she wished, relying instead on
a third party doctor who stated that pregnant women "are a constant
problem in all phases of their employment." Id. at 39.
12. Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n., 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir.
1972), reviewed testimony that in the case of pregnant women:
There is a change in efficiency . . . swelling of the limbs is very
prevalent . . . ability to get around necessitates help and assistance
jobs they had been able to do themselves they now require
help with, or are unable to do them; they are frequently given to
headaches, little irritable things; their personalities change quite a
bit and they are not only hard to live with but hard to employ...
are frequently running to the bathroom . . .
Id. at 39-40. These "ensuing physical conditions" caused the court to find
the mandatory leave of absence rule reasonable. In LaFleur v. Board of
Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971), evidence was relied on that
showed the teachers were embarrassed by "children pointing, giggling,
laughing and making snide remarks .... " Id. at 1210.
13. Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n., 459 F.2d 32, 39 (5th Cir.
1972).
District's Board of School Directors v. Snyder.14 A teacher, al-
ready on a year's leave of absence, became pregnant and had a
child. The school board insisted that she apply for the mandatory
two year maternity leave which, in contrast to the regular leave
of absence, was without salary and salary increments. The court
held that the school board was justified in making such rules and
correct in applying them to all married female employees, whether
on leave or not, and the teacher was consequently dismissed for
disobedience.' 5
Snyder was followed a year later by Brown's Case16 which al-
lowed the dismissal of a teacher who refused to resign due to preg-
nancy but requested sick leave instead. The school in this in-
stance had no rules relating to pregnant employees but the court
held that the termination was justified because she had become an
incompetent teacher as a result of physical incapacity to perform
her duties.17 These two cases were cited in the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court's decision to uphold the school board's regu-
lation in Cerra.'8
In accordance with the precedent, the lower court in Cerra
decided the school board's requirement of resignation was reason-
able since, unlike other illnesses, pregnancy rendered a teacher
incompetent. 19 In addition to finding the regulation reasonable,
particular weight was given to the fact that four pregnant teach-
ers in the district had failed to return to teaching after their chil-
dren were born, leaving the board with a teacher shortage and the
opinion that good management demanded a strict ruling to be
applied without exception to all pregnant teachers.
20
In reversing, the supreme court dealt summarily with both
these positions. The court, noting that Mrs. Cerra had performed
satisfactorily prior to her suspension, decided that a temporary ab-
sence resulting from a physical disability was not a realistic inter-
pretation of incompetency, 2' one of the reasons for dismissal sanc-
tioned by the Public School Code.22 This interpretation of "in-
14. 346 Pa. 103, 29 A.2d 34 (1942).
15. The dissent in this case suggested that although a rule regarding
maternity leave might be reasonable, it was unreasonable as applied to a
teacher already on leave. Since the school board was only empowered to
make reasonable rules, the court should have found for the teacher. School
Dist. v. Snyder, 346 Pa. 103, 29 A.2d 34 (1942).
16. Brown's Case, 151 Pa. Super. 522, 30 A.2d 726, alJ'd, 347 Pa. 418, 32
A.2d 565 (1943).
17. 151 Pa. Super. 526, 30 A.2d 729 (1943).
18. 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 665, 667, 285 A.2d 206, 207 (1971).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 450 Pa. 207, 211, 299 A.2d 277, 279 (1973).
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1122 (1962) which states in pertinent
part:
The only valid causes for termination of a contract heretofore or
hereafter entered into with a professional employe shall be im-
morality, incompetency, intemperance, cruelty, persistent negli-
gence, mental derangement, advocation of or participation in un-
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competency" is in direct contradiction to the definition set forth in
Brown's Case,23 in which the term was construed to include
physical as well as educational qualifications. The court, however,
felt that Brown was distinguishable on its facts, despite its defini-
tions, since the teacher in that case was allegedly incapable of
discharging her duties, whereas the record in Cerra revealed no
such finding.
2 4
Rebutting the argument that administrative difficulties were
obviated by a blanket regulation, the Cerra court proposed a
broader vision of the case's conflicting values. The school's smooth
functioning is interrupted by many recurring problems, none of
which are dealt with so harshly as the pregnant teacher, but most
important is the recognition that efficiency is not of paramount im-
portance.25 The strongest point of the decision is the court's com-
prehension that those issues upon which the lower court based
its decision do not represent the actual question presented by the
case. The real issue as stated by the court "is the legality of the
board's action in terminating Mrs. Cerra's contract for refusing to
resign in accordance with this specific regulation. '26 The Penn-
sylvania Human Relations Act makes it unlawful to refuse to hire
or to discharge from employment an individual on the basis of
sex.2 7 The statute applies to school boards equally with all em-
American or subversive doctrines, persistent and willful violation
of the school laws of this Commonwealth on the part of the pro-
fessional employe ...
The supreme court indicated that if a temporary physical disability came
within the purview of the statute allowing dismissal for incompetency, a
teacher could be dismissed for any illness requiring temporary absence
from school, for example an appendectomy. 450 Pa. 207, 211, 299 A.2d
277, 279 (1973).
23. 151 Pa. Super. 526, 30 A.2d 729 (1943).
24. 450 Pa. 207, 212, 299 A.2d 277, 279 (1973).
25. The court cites Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). In
Stanley the Court states:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve
legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance
in constitutional adjuditation. But the Constitution recognizes
higher values than speed and efficiency. [footnote omitted]. In-deed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the
Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect
the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearingconcern for efficiency and efficacy which may characterize praise-
worthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than
mediocre ones.
Id. at 656.
26. 450 Pa. 207, 212, 299 A.2d 277, 279 (1973).
27. Pt. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (a) (1964). The Human Relations Act
provides:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice, unless based upon
a bona fide occupational qualification . . . (a) For any employer
because of race, color, religious creed, ancestry, age, sex or
national origin of any individual to refuse to hire or employ, or to
ployers.2 8  The court found the school board's actions in singling
out a class of individuals and discharging them from employment
due to a physical condition peculiar to their sex an example of
"sex discrimination pure and simple. '2
As noted in the decision30 sexual discrimination is allowed if
based on a "bona fide occupational qualification." 3' 1 The court,
without defining the limits of the bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation, nevertheless finds that the record contains no support for
such a practice in the instant case. 2 The minimal reference to the
bona fide occupational qualification together with the authority
cited to negative its existence 33 indicates that Pennsylvania courts
will require an individual assessment of each employee's capacities
in measuring the standard of the Human Relations Act.34 The
Act demands that hiring practices be free from prior assumptions
based on characteristics generally attributed to a class of those
similarly situated.3 5 To avoid the operation of the statute, it must
be proven that all or substantially all of those whom the em-
ployer wishes to classify as unemployable would be unable to meet
the requirement of the job.86
bar or to discharge from employment such individual, or to other-
wise discriminate against such individual with respect to com-
pensation, hire, tenure, terms, conditions or privileges of employ-
ment....
28. Cerra v. School Dist., 450 Pa. 207, 213, 299 A.2d 277, 279 (1973);
43 P.S. § 954(b) (1964).
29. 450 Pa. 207, 213, 299 A.2d 277, 280 (1973).
30. Id. at 214, 299 A.2d 277, 280 (1973).
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (1964). Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission Guidelines have outlined sex as a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ): 29 CFR 1604.1 (1972). There it is stated that the
BFOQ is to be interpreted narrowly, and that it is not applicable at all
where refusal to hire is based on assumptions of comparative employment
characteristics, on stereotyped characterization of the sexes, or on the
preference of other employees or clients. The BFOQ is stated to be
applicable where it is necessary for genuineness, e.g. for an actor or actress.
As to state laws prohibiting the employment of females:
[t]he Commission believes that such State laws and regulations,
although originally promulgated for the purpose of protecting
females, have ceased to be relevant to our technology or to the ex-
panding role of the female worker in our economy. The Com-
mission has found that such laws and regulations do not take into
account the capacities, preferences, and abilities of individual fe-
males and tend to discriminate rather than protect.
Id. at 1604.1 (b) (3). The courts have disagreed as to the limits of the BFOQ
exception. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1970); Bowe
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Weeks v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
32. 450 Pa. 207, 214, 299 A.2d 277, 280 (1973).
33. Id.
34. See note 27 supra.
35. 450 Pa. 207, 213, 299 A.2d 277, 280 (1973).
36. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.
1969). In holding that a limitation on weight women were allowed to lift
was not a bona fide occupational qualification, the court said:
The principle of nondiscrimination requires that we hold that in
order to rely on the bona fide occupational qualification exception
an employer has the burden of proving that he had reasonable cause
to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substan-
Recent Cases
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Although the supreme court established Pennsylvania's posi-
tion with Cerra, conflict over the issue countinues in other juris-
dictions.3 7 Initially three major federal court cases dominated
the area.38 Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board39 con-
cerned a teacher who was required to take a leave of absence due
to pregnancy under a school board regulation. The district court,
finding no rational basis for the rule, held that it was discrimina-
tory and in violation of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Cohen was reversed by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1973.40 In LaFleur v. Cleveland Board of Edu-
cation4' another school board rule providing for mandatory ma-
ternity leave of a prescribed period was upheld by the District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio as reasonable and nondis-
criminatory. It was reversed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in 1972.42 A new approach was taken by the District Court
for the Western District of Texas in Schattman v. Texas Em-
ployment Commission.43 The district court declared invalid a ma-
ternity leave policy, which caused plaintiff to lose her career as a
labor market analyst, under the Civil Rights Act of 196444 since it
discriminated on the basis of sex. It was reversed in 1972.
45
As these cases made their uncertain way through the courts, a
number of new litigants challenged similar rules,46 including Air
Force regulations. 47 Those cases concluding that the regulations
limiting the employment of pregnant employees are valid, rely on
many of the arguments previously discussed.48 The risks a preg-
nant woman encounters while working have been advanced in sup-
tially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently
the duties of the job involved.
Id. at 235.
37. See note 1 supra.
38. Cohen v. School Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd,
No. 71-1707 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 1973); LaFleur v. Board of Educ., 326 F. Supp.
1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd, 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972); Schattman
v. Texas Employment Comm'n., 330 F. Supp. 328 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd,
459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972). For a discussion of these cases see, e.g.,
Comment, Mandatory Maternity Leave of Absence Policies-An Equal Pro-
tection Analysis, 45 Tgmp. L.Q. 240 (1972); 36 ALABANY L. REv. 589 (1972);
52 BOSTON UNIv. L. Ruv. 196 (1972); 38 BROOKLYN L. REv. 496 (1971).
39. 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971).
40. No. 71-1707 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 1973).
41. 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
42. 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972).
43. 330 F. Supp. 328 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(c), 2000e-2(d) (1970).
45. 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972).
46. See note 1 supra.
47. See, e.g., Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir.
1972).
48. See notes 6, 10-12 and accompanying text supra.
port of the premise that the employer's overriding concern was
really the health and safety of the work force.49 An attempt is
made to show the reasonableness of the rule by proving that
women act strangely and unpredictably at such times; 50 and that
since they will be taking some time off anyway, control of the
length of absence and when it occurs should remain in the em-
ployer.5 1 It should not be treated as a sick leave in the manner
of other prolonged disabilities that affect both sexes alike, e.g.
heart attacks, because the condition is voluntary.5 2 Since the four-
teenth amendment does not require identity of treatment for both
sexes, the equal protection clause is not applicable if the court
finds a rational basis for the rules.53 Some courts fail to see any
discrimination at all, reasoning that discrimination can only exist
where the sexes are in competition, and since only women can have
children they are not similarly situated with men. Thus the sanc-
tions imposed are valid.
5 4
Those cases rejecting the advantages of restrictive regulations
generally use one of two theories as grounds for their decisions.
Since Title VII of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act forbids
discrimination by sex,53 such regulations are found invalid because
they are based on a classification by sex.56 The second approach is
49. In Struck, the rule demanding the discharge of a pregnant officer
was upheld in the case of the plaintiff who was a nurse in Vietnam. The
reasoning in support of the rule was based on the speculation that should
the hospital where the officer was working be hit with a bomb or attacked
by the enemy, a pregnant nurse may have a miscarriage and become a
patient instead of a nurse. The court went on to answer the obvious
question of what happens to other hospital personnel who might become
patients as a result of injuries received in such a circumstance. They, the
court states, are irrelevant since their injuries are the results of the fortunes
of war. Apparently, an injury sustained by a pregnant officer as a result
of an enemy attack or a bombed hospital is not an example of the fortunes
of war, but something brought on by the unique condition of pregnancy.
The question of why such an officer could not be transferred to a non-
combat zone as are other soldiers who suffer physical disabilities is not
answered. 400 F.2d at 1374-75.
50. See note 12 supra.
51. Cohen v. School Bd., No. 71-1707 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 1973) at 12.
52. Id. at 10.
53. See the review of cases on the application of the equal protection
clause to women cited in Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n., 459
F.2d 32, 40 (5th Cir. 1972).
54. Cohen v. School Bd., No. 71-1707 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 1973) at 5-6.
The court in Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n., 459 F.2d 32 (5th
Cir. 1972) denied the existence of sex discrimination:
A woman, like any other person, is entitled to the Equal Pro-
tection of the law and Due Process of law .... It must be initially
observed that the Texas Employment Commission hired Mrs.
Schattman regardless of her sex and trained her ... It did not
terminate her employment because she was a woman or because she
became pregnant but only because her pregnancy was far advanced.
Id. at 39-40.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
56. LaFleur v. Board of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972) states:
Here, too, we deal with a rule which is inherently based upon a
classification by sex. Male teachers are not subject to pregnancy
but they are subject to many types of illnesses and disabilities. This
Recent Cases
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to examine the rules in the light of the fourteenth amendment.
Several courts have found the rules constitutionally invalid because
they were not reasonably designed to meet their stated objec-
tives. 57 The courts have found that the rules actually become
counter-productive in that they tend to disrupt the educational
continuity supposedly desired.A8 The requirement that there be
some rationality in the nature of the class affected has also been
found lacking,59 since a pregnant teacher who is physically capable
of working is prohibited from doing so, whereas males, who are
subject to known disabilities of other natures, some of which give
ample warning, can work according to their own judgment.6 0 The
court in Williams v. San Francisco Unified School District6 1 found
that the classification was without rational relationship to any
legitimate objective of the school district and furthermore, any ob-
jective sought to be gained could be reached by less restrictive
measures.
6 2
Other arguments in favor of the rule appear insubstantial af-
ter the court has recognized the rule's discriminatory effects. The
health and safety of the woman is clearly not in any more danger
than that of any other employee, or, for that matter, than it would
record indicates clearly that pregnant women teachers have been
singled out for unconstitutionally unequal restrictions upon their
employment.
Id. at 1188.
57. See, e.g., Green v. Board of Educ., No. 72-1676 (2d Cir. Jan. 29,
1973); Heath v. Board of Edue., 345 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Williams
v. School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
58. Williams v. School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438, 446 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
59. Id. at 442-43. The court in Williams, quoting Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971), reviewed the requirement of the equal protection
clause.
The Equal Protection Clause requires more of a state law than non-
discriminatory application within the class it establishes. It also
imposes a requirement of some rationality in the nature of the
class singled out .... Equal Protection Clause ... [denies] to
States the power to legislate different treatment be accorded to
persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of
criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A
classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
60. Green v. Board of Educ., No. 72-1676 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 1973) at
1730, 1732.
61. 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
62. Id. at 449. The court held that the mandatory maternity leave
policy violates the equal protection clause
because it singles out pregnant, certified employees for classifica-
tion without any rational relationship to any legitimate ob-
jective of the District and in addition promotes no compelling int-
erest of the District or State of California.
Id. at 450.
be if she stayed home, if she is medically fit to work. Leaving
control in the hands of the administration regarding when the
teacher will leave may be convenient, but it has been decided by
the Supreme Court that administrative ease is not the highest
value to be considered,"8 and such considerations must yield to the
rights of the individuals affected. The inflexibility of the rules,
by uniformly restricting all the individuals in the class and failing
to adapt to the particular circumstance, are by their very nature
discriminatory.
6 4
In Cerra, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was aided by the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act which forbids discrimination
by sex.65 Relying on this statute made consideration of the four-
teenth amendment superfluous, 66 simplifying the grounds for the
decision. The severity of the rule may also have been influential
in this decision. Whereas most employers merely required a ma-
ternity leave, this district insisted on total resignation, By pro-
hibiting discriminatory regulations which subject pregnant em-
ployees to unequal treatment, Pennsylvania has taken the position
of protecting the individual against attempts to unlawfully restrict
her employment.
MARGARFT H. HUNTING
63. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971); Williams v. School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
64. Heath v. Board of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501, 505 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
65. See note 27 supra.
66. 450 Pa. 207, 213, 299 A.2d 277, 279 (1973).
PARENT-CHILD-THE RIGHT OF A STATE TO
ORDER SURGERY ON A MINOR IN A
NONTERMINAL SITUATION DESPITE
THE RELIGIOUS OBJECTIONS OF
THE PARENT
Green Appeal, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972).
In Green Appeal,' a case of first impression, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court considered the question of whether the state, under
the Juvenile Court Law,2 was empowered to order remedial sur-
gery on a minor child for a nonterminal affliction despite the re-
ligious objections of a nonconsenting parent. The court held that
as between the parent and the state, the state does not have an
interest of sufficient magnitude outweighing the parent's religious
beliefs to justify the authorization of the surgery.3 The court,
however, retained its jurisdiction in the matter pending an evi-
dentiary hearing in which the minor's wishes regarding the sur-
gery would be determined.
Ricky Ricardo Green was born on September 10, 1955, and
since that time had suffered two attacks of poliomyelitis. At the
time of the original proceeding, his condition was one of residual
poliomyelitis with weakness of all four extremities and paralytic
1. 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243 (1970) empowers a juvenile court to
declare a child neglected. The words "neglected child" shall include:
(c) A child whose parent, guardian, custodian, or legal representa-
tive neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary subsistence,
education, medical, or surgical care, or other care necessary for his
or her health, morals, or well-being.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 250 (1970) gives the juvenile court the power to
appoint a guardian for such neglected child:
At the hearing or any continuation thereof, the judge shall,
after an inquiry of the facts, determine whether the best interests
and welfare of the child and the state require the care, guidance,
and control of such child, and shall make an order accordingly.
The court may: . . . commit the child to the care, guidance,
and control of some reputable citizen of good moral character
* .. or commit the child to some suitable institution . . . one of
whose objects is the care, guidance and control of delinquent, de-
pendent, and neglected children.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 255 (1933) subjects the child to his appointed
guardian's authority:
In any case where the court shall award a dependent, neglected,
or delinquent child to the care of any . . . individual, the child
shall, unless otherwise ordered become a ward, and be subject to
the guardian-ship of the . . . individual to whose care it is com-
mitted....
3. 448 Pa. 338, 348, 292 A.2d 381, 392 (1972).
scoliosis. 4 Anticipating that Ricky would, as a result of his afflic-
tions, become a total invalid, the doctors at the State Hospital for
Crippled Children recommended corrective surgery. The minor's
mother a Jehovah's Witness, did not object to the surgery itself,
but because of her religious beliefs would not consent to the blood
transfusions essential in the operation.5
The Director of the State Hospital for Crippled Children peti-
tioned under the Juvenile Court Law, the Common Pleas Court of
Philadelphia to have Ricky Green declared a "neglected child"
within the meaning of the Act.6 The court dismissed the petition,
stating that although the statutory standard for neglect was met
by the refusal to permit the surgery, it would not appoint a guard-
ian since there was no life-endangering emergency situation pres-
ent.7 The superior court unanimously reversed the decision of the
common pleas court and remanded the matter for the appointment
of a guardian. 8 The mother appealed the decision, and the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania granted allocatur.
The Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized
the distinction between the freedom to hold religious beliefs and
the freedom to engage in practices stemming from those beliefs.
The Court has often held that religious practices are susceptible to
government regulation.9  In Prince v. Massachusetts,0  the
Supreme Court dealt specifically with the right of a state to inter-
fere with the religious practices of parents when those practices
affected their children. Although parents' rights to guide their
children's religious education and practices are generally im-
mune from state intervention, they are not absolutely immune:
Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well-being,
the state as parens patriae may restrict the parents' con-
trol. Its authority is not nullified merely because the par-
ent grounds his claim to control the child's conduct . . on
religion or conscience. . . [t]he state has a wide range
of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in
4. The practical effects of the affliction were severe obesity and 94%
curvature of the spine due to the weakening of the trunk muscles. He was
bed-ridden and unable to stand or walk.
5. Ricky's mother also rejected the proposal that Ricky's own blood
be used in the operation after it had been obtained by periodic bleeding.
6. See note 2 supra.
7. Green Case, 220 Pa. Super. 191, 193, 286 A.2d 681, 682 (1971).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
10. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). The Massachusetts child labor law pro-
hibited boys under 12 and girls under 18 from selling any type of literature
on a public street and provided fines and penalties for parents or guardians
who furnished the material to minors and permitted or compelled the
minor to sell material on the street. A Jehovah Witness guardian of such
a minor appealed her conviction under the statute on the grounds that
it was a violation of her freedom of religion and denial of equal protection
of the laws to prohibit her child from selling religious literature on the
street. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute on
the grounds it was a valid exercise of the state's authority to guard the
welfare of its minor citizens.
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things affecting the child's welfare; and this includes, to
some extent, matters of religion and conscience."
The general principles enunciated in Prince have been applied
in cases where an adult parent has refused on religious grounds to
consent to blood transfusions necessary to save the life of his in-
fant child. Every jurisdiction which has dealt with this situation
has upheld the state's right to order the transfusions despite the
religious objections of the parents.12 However, these decisions are
distinguishable from Green since in the instant case the minor's
life was not endangered by the refusal to consent to the trans-
fusion.
The facts of Green Appeal are without precedent in Pennsyl-
vania, although the issue had ostensibly arisen previously when a
child's life was endangered. 1 There are, however, two decisions of
the New York Court of Appeals14 which are relevant precedent for
the instant case, but they are separated by seventeen years and
contradictory results.
In re Seiferth,15 involved a fourteen-year-old boy with a hare
lip and cleft palate. His father believed that the natural forces of
the universe would heal his son and had instilled in his son a fear
of surgery that would render the surgery useless because of the
need for cooperation in post-operative speech therapy. Medical
testimony indicated that the surgery should have been performed
earlier, but that it could still be postponed, although the delay
would render it less successful. The minor was reluctant to have
the surgery performed, and his father refused to authorize it
without the child's consent. The New York Court of Appeals re-
fused to appoint a guardian and order the operation, stating that
although the Children's Court did have the authority in a "drastic
situation" to direct an operation despite the religious objection of
the parents, such was not the case.' 6 There was no life-endanger-
ing "present emergency" facing the boy, and "time was not of the
11. Id. at 165-67.
12. People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769,
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); Mirrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (C.A.
Mo. 1952); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421,
201 A.2d 537 (1964); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 741 (1962);
Santos v. Goldstein, 16 A.D.2d 744, 227 N.Y.S.2d 450, appeal dismissed, 232
N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1962); In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 185 N.E.2d 128 (C.P.
Lucas 1962). See generally Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 1138 (1953).
13. In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. Dist. 561 (C.P. Phila. 1912) (court refused
to order an operation to correct rickets, but the surgey's success was
doubtful, and the parents had already lost seven children. Also at that time,
moral depravity was the sole ground for appointing a guardian).
14. In re Sampson, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972); In re Sie-
ferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955).
15. 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955).
16. Id. at 85, 127 N.E.2d at 823.
essence." Also, because of the necessity of the boy's cooperation
in the post-operative therapy, his lack of consent was important.
17
In dissent, Judge Fuld contended that every child has a right
so far as possible to lead a normal life, and when parents interfere
with that right, the courts should use the powers given them by
the legislature to protect the child.18 Accordingly, the dissent
found that the minor's right to a normal life was imperiled and
the court could not avoid its duty by permitting the boy to make
the decision while he was still under the influence of his "mis-
guided parents."'19
In the second New York state case of importance, In re Samp-
son,20 a fifteen-year-old had been stricken with neurofibromatosis
that grotesquely disfigured his face. As a result of his affliction,
the child sustained substantial psychological difficulties which
prevented him from attending school and left him a virtual illiter-
ate. His mother, a Jehovah's Witness, refused to consent to the
blood transfusions which were necessary to the success of correc-
tive surgery.
The issue before the trial court 2' was whether it should com-
pel a minor to undergo a dangerous surgical procedure for the
partial correction, but not cure, of a severe facial deformity over the
religious objections of his mother. Incorporating Judge Fuld's lan-
guage from his dissent in Seiferth, the court held that not only
would the mother's religious objections give way to the state's
paramount duty "to insure the minor's right to grow up with a
sound mind in a.sound body,"122 but also that the minor's consent
to the operation was unnecessary. 3 Despite the risks of the opera-
tion and medical testimony that postponement would increase the
possibility of success, the court, giving priority to the "develop-
mental and psychological factors stemming from the deform-
ity,"24 ordered the operation.
The apparent conflict between Seiferth and Sampson was re-
solved by the New York Court of Appeals' statement that its de-
cision in Seiferth did not negate the state's power to order the op-
eration in a non-fatal situation, but that its decision not to order
the operation was merely a choice of two alternatives proposed by
the two lower courts.
2 5
Green Appeal rejected the reasoning of Sampson and refused
to extend the right of the state to abridge a minor's parent's re-
ligious practices by authorizing surgery where the child was not
suffering from a terminal condition. The court stated that there
17. Id.
18. Id. at 86, 127 N.E.2d at 823.
19. Id. at 87, 127 N.E.2d at 824.
20. 29 N.Y.S.2d 900, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972).
21. 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Farn. Ct. 1970).
22. 65 Misc. 2d 658, 669, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 652 (Fain. Ct. 1970), citing
In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 90, 185 N.E.2d 128, 132 (C.P. Lucas 1962).
23. 65 Misc. 2d 658, 672, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 657 (Fain. Ct. 1970).
24. Id. at 670, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 655.
25. In re Sampson, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 901, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686, 687 (1972).
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were actually two key issues involved in the case: (1) whether the
state could order the operation despite the parent's religious objec-
tions, and (2) whether the state could order the operation if the
child desired the operation and the parents refused.28
In dealing with the first issue, the court refused to accept the
less restrictive "required surgery" standard of the New York law
and chose to retain the standard that required the child's life to be
endangered to justify the state's intervention with the parents' re-
ligious practices. The court refused to accept responsibility for
determining what surgery was required, stating that to do so
would "conflict with the mother's religious beliefs," and that the
responsibility for such a decision could only "rest in the Creator."' 27
Evidencing a concern with the difficult application of the New
York standard, the court stated that: "[t]he problems created by
Sampson are endless. '28 Thus, in order to stop what it feared
would turn into a flood of difficult litigation, the court held that,
"as between the parent and the state, the state does not have an
interest of sufficient magnitude outweighing a parent's religious
beliefs when the child's life is not immediately imperiled by his
physical condition."
29
The majority stated that the ultimate issue was not yet before
it, that issue being "whether a parent's religious beliefs are para-
mount to the possibly adverse decision of the child. ' 30 In the in-
stant case, there was no evidence of the desires of the sixteen-year-
old minor regarding the proposed surgery, so the court remanded
the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine the child's de-
sires and reserved its jurisdiction in case a parent/child conflict
arose. The court stated that minors of "sufficient maturity" should
be allowed to determine the necessity of such surgery. In justifi-
cation of this decision, Mr. Chief Justice Jones noted the recent
propensity of courts to permit "an intelligent child of sufficient
maturity"3 1 to decide with which parent he wished to live in a cus-
tody dispute,3 2 to waive constitutional rights and accept a life
sentence,33 and to sue a parent for personal injuries in an auto
accident.3 4 These instances, however, presume that the minor in-
volved possessed a degree of free will and will be furnished with
26. 448 Pa. 338, 348, 292 A.2d 387, 392 (1972).
27. Id. at 345, 292 A.2d at 390.
28. Id. at 348, 292 A.2d at 392.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 353, 292 A.2d 394.
31. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 (1972).
32. Snellgross Adoption Case, 432 Pa. 158, 247 A.2d 596 (1968).
33. Commonwealth v. Moses, 446 Pa. 350, 287 A.2d 131 (1971). Minor
was allowed to waive right to counsel and utter incriminating statements
competent as evidence against him after having been informed of his rights.
34. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 131 (1971).
competent legal advice with which he can make an intelligent de-
cision. Ricky Green, however, was bed-ridden, illiterate, and to-
tally dependent on his mother, and would not seem to fall into the
category of the "intelligent child of sufficient maturity."
The dissent,35 consonant with its focus on the actual well-be-
ing of the child, criticized the majority's retention of the fatal non-
fatal standard and advocated adoption of the New York rule which
would deem surgery "required" when in the discretion of the trial
court it is considered necessary to remove a serious obstacle to the
child's right to live a normal life. 6 The adoption of the required
surgery standard was further urged as consistent with the Juve-
nile Court Law which governs such proceedings. The statute
contains no specific provision restricting the court's power to order
an operation to "life and death" situations, and in fact speaks only
in terms of "health" when authorizing state intervention."7 Thus,
in addition to affirming the child's right to live and grow up with
a sound mind and body, the dissent held that the correct construc-
tion of the statute authorized the state's intervention whenever a
threat to a minor's health existed in the form of a denial to lead a
normal life.
The minority, however, did not agree completely with the New
York decision and did not state that a minor's consent would be
immaterial to the final disposition of the case. Although it dis-
agreed with the majority's decision to hold an evidentiary hearing
to determine Ricky's desires, the objection was based on the dis-
sent's doubt that Ricky would be able to make an independent
decision because of the exceptionally strong influence his mother
had on him.38 Unfortunately, the majority did not state what legal
grounds would qualify a minor as being "intelligent" and "suffi-
ciently mature" to make a decision in such an important situation.
This determination is to be left to the discretion of the trial court.
In rejecting the reasoning of the Sampson court and refusing
to order an operation against the parent's religious objections un-
less the child is in danger of death, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has set a precedent which refuses to fully protect an imma-
ture minor. If an immature minor is involved, his opinion, even if
he is capable of forming one, will not be considered and the par-
ent's religious objections will control. However, if the trial court
decides that the child is sufficiently mature to make his own deci-
sion, the court will follow that decision, whether the child
chooses the operation or not. The court in Green Appeal, while
refusing to force its decision on a "mature" child, seems to leave
unprotected the immature minor child who is unable to make his
own decision and who would seem to be the person most in need
of the state's protection.
KENNETH P. WALSH
35. Justices Roberts and Pomeroy joined Justice Eagen in dissent.
36. 448 Pa. 338, 353, 292 A.2d 387, 394 (1972).
37. See note 2 supra.
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